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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY,
Petitioner,
SUPREME COURT
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAHf and DEFAULT INDEMNITY
FUND OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,

Case No. 21049
Category No. 6

Respondent.
PETITIONER'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1.

Whether the Industrial Commission acted without or in
excess of its statutory powers in issuing a
Supplemental Order when an appropriate motion for
review was not filed within the time period required by
the Commission's enabling statute.

ISSUE 2.

Whether the Industrial Commission exceeded the
authority granted in the enabling statute in ordering
the petitioner to pay monies directly to the Default
Indemnity Fund.

ISSUE 3.

Whether the Supplemental Conclusion of Law entered by
the Industrial Commission in connection with the
Supplemental Order is in accordance with established
law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.
This case is an action for Workers' Compensation

benefits before the Industrial Commission.

The Administrative

Law Judge Timothy C. Allen entered the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order on January 22, 1985 (R. 71, A-l).
The Order did not require the petitioner Thomas A* Paulsen dba
Thomas A. Paulsen Company to perform any act.

After the

statutory time for seeking review of the Order had elapsed,
respondent Default Indemnity Fund requested, by means of an ex
parte letter to the Administrative Law Judge, a Supplemental
Order be issued (R. 76, A-6).
Without notice or hearing, Supplemental Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were entered requiring by the
Administrative Law Judge on October 8, 1985, Thomas A. Paulsen to
pay certain sums directly to the Default Indemnity Fund (R. 77,
A-7).

Mr. Paulsen moved the Industrial Commission to review the

Supplemental Order (R. 79, A - 9 ) , which motion was denied (R. 82,
A-12).
Mr. Paulsen filed a Petition for Writ of Review in
this Court and moved for summary disposition.
moved for summary disposition.
2.

Respondents also

Both motions were denied.

Statement of Facts.
On April 1, 1984, David B. Paulsen was injured
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while in the employ of Thomas A. Paulsen dba Thomas A. Paulsen
Company (R. 71, A-l). David Paulsen did not tell his employer,
Thomas Paulsen, of the injury until some two weeks after the
accident (R. 36-37, A-17), nor did he seek medical attention
until at least three weeks after the accident (R. 27-28, A-19).
On August 1, 1984, David Paulsen filed an application for hearing
seeking payment of medical bills and other compensation (R. 4,
A-14).

A hearing was held on October 12, 1984 with

Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen presiding (R. 18,
A-15).

Both David Paulsen and Thomas Paulsen appeared pro se (R.

18, A-15).
On January 22, 1985, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order were entered.

In the Findings, the Judge set

forth his determination that Thomas Paulsen "was uninsured for
Workers' Compensation purposes" at the time of the injury (R.
72, A-2). However, the Judge found that Thomas Paulsen had made
good faith efforts to obtain Workers' Compensation insurance, but
that through no fault of his own, he did not receive coverage (R.
72, A-2). The Judge further determined that Thomas Paulsen was
insolvent (R. 72-73, A-2 - A-3).

Finally, the Judge found that

David Paulsen was entitled to be compensated from the Default
Indemnity Fund (R. 72, A-3).
In accordance with Section 35-1-82.52, the Judge
specified the amount of the compensation to be paid to David
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Paulsen and ordered the Default Indemnity Fund ("the Fund") to
pay the compensation (R. 73-74, A-3 - A-4).

The Judge did not

order Thomas Paulsen to pay any compensation to David Paulsen.
Because of its pivotal importance, the Order is
reproduced here in toto:
"ORDER:
"IT IS THEREFOR ORDERED that the Default
Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary
vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Fund, to pay to David B.
Paulsen, compensation at the rate of
$233.44 per week for 21 weeks or a total
of $4,902.24, as temporary total
disability for the period April 8, 1984 to
and including September 1, 1984, resulting
from the industrial injury of April 1,
1984; said benefits to be paid in a lump
sum.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default
Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary
vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Fund, to pay to David B.
Paulsen compensation at the rate of
$200.00 per week for 46.8 weeks or a total
of $9,360.00, as compensation for a 15%
permanent partial impairment resulting
from the industrial injury of April 1,
1984; said benefits to commence effective
September 2, 1984, with accrued amounts
due and owing in a lump sum.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default
Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary
vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Fund, to pay to David B.
Paulsen, the sum of $6,804.49, which
amount represents the medical expenses
incurred by Mr. Paulsen as a result of the
industrial injury of April 1, 1984; Mr.
Paulsen is to pay the medical care
providers listed in the Findings of Fact
of this Order.
-4-

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for
Review of the foregoing shall be filed in
writing within fifteen (15) days from the
date hereof specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections and
unless so filed this Order shall be final
and not subject to review or appeal." (R.
73-74, A-3 - A-4).
None of the affected parties sought review of the
Order within the 15-day time limit set forth in both the Order
and the applicable statutes.

In particular, Mr. Paulsen did not

seek review because the Order had no effect on him.
Eight months after the Order was entered, the
Default Indemnity Fund sent an ex parte letter to the Judge
requesting a Supplemental Order requiring Thomas Paulsen to repay
the Fund the amounts it paid to David Paulsen (R. 76, A-6). In
its letter the Fund made several misrepresentations concerning
the original Order.

Specifically, the Fund stated that the

original Order required Thomas A. Paulsen Company to pay money to
David Paulsen; and further, it stated that the Order granted the
Default Indemnity Fund full rights of subrogation.

Both

representations were entirely false.
On October 8, 1985 without giving notice or
granting a hearing, the Administrative Judge acted upon the
Fund's letter and issued Supplemental Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 77, A-7). The Supplemental
Order directed Thomas Paulsen to pay directly to the Default
Indemnity Fund the amount paid by the Fund to David Paulsen.
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On October 23, 1985, Thomas Paulsen brought a
motion for review (R. 79, A-9) which was denied on November 8,
1985 (R. 82, A-12).

Thereafter, Mr. Paulsen filed a Petition for

Writ of Review in this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are three reasons why the Supplemental Order
should be vacated:

First, the Commission exceeded its statutory

authority in issuing the Supplemental Order; second, the
Commission exceeded statutory authority by ordering Thomas
Paulsen to pay money directly to the Default Indemnity Fund; and
third, the Commission based its Supplemental Order on an
erroneous conclusion of law.
For any action of the Industrial Commission to be
valid, it must be authorized by statute.

This is necessarily so

because the Commission is an agency of statutory creation and has
no common law powers.

There is no authority for the type of

Supplemental Order issued in this case.

There are only two

sections in the Worker's Compensation Act which authorize the
Commission to render a Supplemental Order.

The first is Section

35-1-82.53 and the second is Section 35-1-78.
Section 35-1-82.53 reguires as a condition precedent to
a Supplemental Order that a proper Motion for Review be filed.
In the present case, the Motion for Review, if one was filed, was
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not filed within the 15 day time limit set forth in the statute
and did not state in detail the errors sought to be reviewed.

As

a proper motion had not been filed, a Supplemental Order could
not have been issued pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53.

Moreover,

under Section 35-1-82.52, the original order had become the final
award of the Commission, and there is no statutory authority
which would permit an Administrative Law Judge to review the
final award of the Commission.

However, that is what took place

in this case.
The only other authority for issuing a Supplemental
Order is under the Commission's continuing jurisdiction granted
in Section 35-1-78.

However, this power cannot be used unless

there is some change or new development not known at the time the
original Order was entered.

There was no showing, nor could

there be, of a change or new development not known at that time.
Therefore, the Commission could not invoke its continuing
jurisdiction to authorize its actions.
The second reason the Supplemental Order is invalid is
that the Commission had no authority to require Thomas Paulsen to
pay money directly to the Default Indemnity Fund.
35-1-107 governs this issue and is clear.

Section

The Default Indemnity

Fund's only right to reimbursement is the right of subrogation.
Nowhere does the Code authorize the Commission to order the
employer to pay reimbursement directly to the Default Indemnity
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Fund,

To the contrary, the Code requires the Fund to seek

reimbursement through the Courts under Section 35-1-58.

Because

the Commission had no authority to order Paulsen to pay money
directly to the Fund for reimbursement, the Supplemental Order
must be vacated.
Finally, the Supplemental Order is based solely upon a
single erroneous conclusion of law.

The Supplemental Conclusion

of Law states that Paulsen was liable to pay the compensation
benefits paid by the Fund because of Section 35-1-107.

There is

nothing in that section or any other section of the Worker's
Compensation Act which would indicate that merely because the
Fund was required to pay an award to an injured employee, that
without more the award is the responsibility of the employee.
There is no legal basis which would support the Supplemental
Order.

Therefore, the Supplemental Order should be set aside.

ARGUMENT
The Supplemental Order rendered by the Industrial
Commission must be vacated as it is contrary to law.
Supplemental Order is invalid for three reasons:

The

First, the

Commission exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the
Supplemental Order; second, the Commission exceeded its statutory
authority in directing Thomas Paulsen to pay money directly to
the Default Indemnity Fund; and third, the Supplemental Order is
based upon an erroneous Conclusion of Law.
-8-

Any one of the three

errors is sufficient to require the Supplemental Order to be
vacated.

POINT I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED
BEYOND HIS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN
ISSUING THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER.
It is axiomatic that an administrative agency can only
exercise those powers which are conferred upon it by statute.
Piercey v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake Cityy 116 Utah
138r 208 P.2d 1123 (1949).

An agency of statutory creation has

no general or common law powers.

Park Motel Corp. v. Kansas

Dept. of Health and Environment, 234 Kan. 374, 673 P.2d 1126
(1983).

Thus, in order for the Supplemental Order to have been

valid, its issuance must necessarily have been authorized by
statute.
There are only two code sections which authorize an
Administrative Judge of the Industrial Commission to issue a
Supplemental Order.
35-1-78.

These are Section 35-1-82.53 and Section

As will be shown below, neither section authorizes the

Commission to issue the type of Supplemental Order which was
issued in this case.

As there is no authority for the issuance

of the Supplemental Order, it must be vacated as being ultra
vires.
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A.

The Supplemental Order is invalid because a proper

motion for review was not filed within the time required by
Section 35-1-82.53.
Section 35-1-82.53 provides the only statutory
authority for reviewing an order of an Administrative Law Judge.
By its terms, a review of such an order is conditioned upon the
proper filing of a motion for review.

Section 35-1-82.55,

U.C.A., provides the requirement which every motion for review
must meet.

First, any motion for review must "specify in detail

the particular errors and objections" for which review is sought;
and second, every motion for review "must be filed within fifteen
days of the date of any order of the Administrative Law Judge or
Commission.. . "
The Order for which the Default Indemnity Fund
sought review was dated January 22, 1985.

By the terms of the

Order, and by the language of Sections 35-1-82.52 and 35-1-82.55,
the Order became the final award of the Commission on February 6,
1985.

The letter of the Default Indemnity Fund to the

1
Section 35-1-82.54 provides authority to review Supplemental
Orders of an Administrative Law Judge, cases referred to the
Commission by an Administrative Law Judge, as well as orders of
the Commission. Section 35-1-83 provides the authority for
review of awards of the Commission. Neither section provides for
review of an order of an Administrative Law Judge. Review of
such an order must be done under the procedures set forth in
Section 35-1-82.53.
-10-

Administrative Law Judge reguesting a Supplemental Order, even if
it can be construed as a motion for review, met neither of two
above-stated reguirements of Section 35-1-82.55.

First, it did

not specify in detail the errors in the Order, or the objections
thereto.

Second, it was not filed within the fifteen days from

the date of the Order, but rather was filed more than seven
months after the Order became final.
Section 35-1-82.53 reguires that a proper motion be
filed before the Administrative Law Judge may issue a
Supplemental Order.
was not timely filed.

It is clear that a proper Motion for Review
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge

was without statutory authority to enter the Supplemental Order.
Thus the Order must be vacated as being ultra vires.
B.

The Supplemental Order is invalid because the

Administrative Law Judge sought to review the final award of the
Commission.
The Supplemental Order issued by the Administrative
Law Judge was ultra vires as it sought to review a final award of
the Commission.

An Administrative Law Judge is without statutory

authority to review such an order.
Section 35-1-82.53 sets forth the authority of the
Administrative Law Judge to review orders.

It is clear that he

can review his own orders, but nowhere is there authority granted
an Administrative Law Judge to review a final award of the
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Commission.

Once an order has become the final award of the

Commission, the only statutory means of review is by filing an
action in this Court under Section 35-1-83.
The Order dated January 22, 1985 was a final award
of the Commission.

Section 35-1-82.52, Utah Code Annotated,

provides that "[t]he Order of the Administrative Law Judge or
Commission shall be the final award of the Commission unless a
petition for review is filed as provided in Section 35-1-82.53."
As shown above, a timely petition for review was not filed within
the requirements of Section 35-1-82.53.

The Order dated January

22, 1985 became the final award of the Commission of February 6,
1985.
Inasmuch as the Order which the Fund sought to
review was the final award of the Commission, the Administrative
Law Judge was without statutory authority to review it.
Therefore, the Supplemental Order was ultra vires and should be
vacated.
C.

The Supplemental Order is invalid because the

requirements for exercising the continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission were not met.
As pointed out above, the Order dated January 22,
1985 became the final award of the Commission on February 6,
1985.

Thereafter, it could only be reviewed by this Court or

modified by the Commission under its powers of continuing
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jurisdiction granted in Section 35-1-78.

However, it is clear

that the Commission's continuing jurisdiction could not be
invoked in this type of case.
The purpose of Section 35-1-78 is to provide the
Commission with the ability to make changes in previous orders
because of changed circumstances.

The "continuing jurisdiction

and latitude was no doubt given for the express purpose
suggested,...to avoid the making of excessive or inadeguate
awards in doubtful and complicated cases..."

Carter v.

Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 520, 290 P. 776, 782 (1930).
However, the section "was not intended to authorize the
Commission to resume jurisdiction of a case that has already been
determined, unless there has been some change or new development
not previously known."

Brkhakic v. Industrial Commission, 63

Utah 582, 227 P. 1036, 1038 (1924).
The law has been consistent from the time the rule
was laid down in the bedrock case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial
Commission, 61 Utah 514, 215 P. 1047 (1923) until the present.
Unless there is some change (whether that is in the injury or
otherwise) from the time the final Order was rendered, the
Commission cannot invoke its continuing jurisdiction.

Kennecott

Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d
952 (1967).
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There has not been, nor can there be, any showinq
of a change that would permit the Commission to evoke its
jurisdiction under Section 35-1-78.

Therefore, the Supplemental

Order could not have been issued pursuant to that section.

The

Supplemental Order was therefore ultra vires, and should be
vacated.

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS
WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ORDER
THOMAS PAULSEN TO PAY MONEY DIRECTLY
TO THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND.
As stated above, the Industrial Commission has no
authority except that granted by statute.

Any action taken by

the Commission which is not authorized by statute is invalid.

In

adopting and affirming the Supplemental Order the Industrial
Commission exceeded its statutory authority.
In granting the Default Indemnity Fund's request for a
Supplemental Order, the Administrative Law Judge ordered Thomas
Paulsen to:
"...pay the Default Indemnity Fund of the Utah
Industrial Commission, the sum of $21,002.63,
for benefits heretofore paid by the Fund on
behalf of Thomas A. Paulsen Company to David
B. Paulsen for the industrial injury he
sustained on April 1, 1984." (R. 77, A-7.)
There is nothing in the Workers' Compensation Act which
would authorize the Commission to order an employer to pay money
directly to the Default Indemnity Fund for the purpose of
-14-

reimbursing the Fund for benefits it paid to the injured
employee.

To the contrary, the language applicable to the issue

is found in Section 35-1-107(3) which states:
"(3) To the extent of the compensation and
other benefits paid or payable to an employee
or their dependents from the Default Indemnity
Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the
rights, powers, and benefits of the employee
or their dependents against the employer
failing to make compensation payments."
The statute is clear, the Fund only has rights of subrogation.
Had the legislature intended the Commission to have the
authority to order an employer to reimburse the Fund directly, it
would have added language similar to that found in subsection (8)
of that same section:
"...and [the Commission] shall direct the
additional penalty to be paid into the Fund."
The legislature did not grant the Industrial Commission
the authority it sought to execute by ordering Thomas Paulsen to
pay money directly to the Fund.

Because there is no statutory

basis which would support the Supplemental Order, it must be
vacated as being ultra vires.

POINT III
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER MUST BE
VACATED BECAUSE THE SUPPLEMENTAL
CONCLUSION OF LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS
BASED IS ERRONEOUS.
Section 35-1-82.52 requires that if compensation
benefits are granted to the claimant, "the order shall
-15-

specify.>.by whom and to whom such benefits shall be paid..."
(Emphasis added.)

In accordance with this, in its original

order, the Commission ordered the Default Indemnity Fund to pay
David Paulsen compensation benefits.

The Commission did not

order Thomas Paulsen to pay any amount to David Paulsen.
In granting the Fund's request for a Supplemental
Order, the Commission entered the following Conclusion of Law:
"Pursuant to Section 35-1-107, the [Workers'
Compensation benefits paid to David Paulsen by
the Default Indemnity Fund] were and are the
responsibility of the uninsured employer..."
This Conclusion of Law is erroneous.

There is nothing

in Section 35-1-107 which would indicate that merely because the
Default Indemnity Fund paid an award to the employee, the award
is the responsibility of the employer.

The only language in

Section 35-1-107 which gives rights of reimbursement to the Fund
against the employer is that found in subsection (3).

In that

subsection, the legislature granted the Fund, by subrogation, all
the rights, powers, and benefits of an employee against the
employer failing to make compensation payments.
Therefore, by its terms, Section 35-1-107 grants no
rights of reimbursement to the Fund unless employee would have
rights against the employer, or in other words, unless the order
granting compensation from the Fund also required the employer to
pay the compensation.

A reading of the original Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order demonstrates that the
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Administrative Law Judge felt the employer to be liable only if
other sources of funds were not available.

Because there were no

personal funds available from Paulsen and because there were
funds available from the Default Indemnity Fundf the Judge
concluded that the employer was not liable.

The Judge apparently

concluded that under the present facts the Default Indemnity Fund
was to act in a manner similar to the manner in which the Special
Fund operates when additional benefits are granted under Section
35-1-70.
Inasmuch as the original Order did not order Thomas
Paulsen to pay compensation benefits, the employee has no rights
against him.

Therefore, Section 35-1-107 does not make the

benefits the responsibility of Thomas Paulsen.

Thus the

conclusion is erroneous.
Because the Supplemental Order was premised on an
erroneous conclusion of law, it should be vacated.

CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate the Supplemental Order of the
Industrial Commission dated October 8, 1985.
necessary for three reasons:

Such action is

First, the Administrative Law Judge

and the Commission were without statutory authority to review or
modify a prior final award of the Commission under the facts of
this case; second, the Administrative Law Judge and the
Commission were without statutory authority to order Thomas
-17-

Paulsen to pay money directly to the Default Indemnity Fund for
the purpose of reimbursement; and third, the sole legal
conclusion upon which the Supplemental Order was based is
erroneous, leaving no legal support for the Supplemental Order,
Since the Industrial Commission is an agency of statutory
creation, it must look to its enabling legislation for authority.
If there is no statutory authority or legal basis for an order of
the Industrial Commission, the Order must be vacated as being
ultra vires.

Such is the case at bar.
*—~ day of May, 1986.
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER

By
At tfirmed—for^Pe t i
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
If the undersigned, hereby certify that on the

^

day of May, 1986, I caused four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF to be served on Respondents by
hand delivering the same to::

Suzan P i x t o n , Esq.
160 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondents
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 84000663

DAVID B. PAULSEN,

*

Applicant,
vs.
THOMAS A PAULSEN CO.
(uninsured)

Defendants.

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*
*
*
*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

BEFORE:
APPEARANCES:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 12,
198A at 10:00 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.
David B. Paulsen, PRO SE.
Thomas A. Paulsen, PRO SE

At the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing, the medical issue was
submitted to the medical panel for its evaluation. The medical panel report
was received by the Commission and copies were distributed to the parties.
Fifteen (15) days having elapsed since the mailing of said medical panel
report, and no objections having been received thereto the medical panel
report is admitted into evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant herein sustained an industrial injury on April 1, 1984
while employed by the defendant, Thomas Paulsen, general contractor. On that
date, he was helping with the cementing of a roof of a building under
construction.
In order to accomplish this task, Mr, Paulsen was required to
pull 5 gallon buckets of cement approximately 14 feet from the ground up to
the roof, by using a rope on the bucket. The rope had a series of knots in
it, which the applicant would use to pull the bucket up to the top of the
roof.
He was accomplishing this task by bending down on his knees and
reaching down over the edge of the roof. While he was so engaged, he felt a
pull in his neck, which he did not pay too much attention to, since as a
carpenter he had experienced various pulls before.
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He reported to work for approximately a week after the injury or
until April 7, 198A.
Thereafter, Mr. Paulsen reported to the Holladay
Chiropractic Clinic for chiropractic treatment.
After receiving x-rays and
adjustments from Dr. Van Slooten, he was referred to Dr. Robert Morrow. Dr.
Morrow saw the applicant on May 1, 1984 and immediately had him admitted to
the St. Mark's Hospital for neck surgery. The applicant being hesitant about
surgery, requested a second opinion which he received from Dr. Robert Lamb.
Or. Lamb agreed with the need for surgery, and on May 7, 1984 excised the C5
md C6 disc from the applicant's neck, and also performed a two level fusion.
The applicant was told to remain off work for three months, and was released
to return to work on or about September 1, 1984, by Dr. Lamb. Mr. Paulsen has
lince returned to work and has not had any further problems with his neck.
The applicant denied any prior problems with his neck.
The case was referred to a medical panel for a determination of
permanent partial impairment. The medical panel found that the applicant
sustained a 15% permanent partial impairment of the whole body due to
industrial injury of April 1, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge adopts
findings of the medical panel as his own.

the
has
the
the

As a result of this injury, the applicant has sustained the following
medical expenses:
Dr. Lamb
Dr. Morrow
Dr. Peters
St. Mark's Hospital
Diagnostic Radiology
Medications
Dr. Van Slooten

$1,445.00
312.00
437.00
3,731.25
164,30
330.54
384.40

Total

$6,804.49

These expenses are the responsibility of the employer, since the
employer was uninsured for workers* compensation purposes at the time of the
industrial injury.
However, some mention should be made of the situation
surrounding the defendant being uninsured.
The file contains information
indicating that Mr. Thomas Paulsen,, the employer, in good faith made efforts
to obtain workers' compensation coverage on February 23, 1984 from a Rogers
Insurance Inc., P.O. Box 725, Provo, Ut. When the applicant tried to make a
claim with American States Insurance, he was advised that no policy for
insurance had been issued.
Rather, it appeared that the insurance agent,
Rogers Insurance Inc., absconded with the employer's funds and did not
purchase the coverage.
The Administrative Law Judge was advised by the
Insurance Department of the State of Utah, that Rogers Insurance is defunct
and judgement proof.
Upon taking testimony from the employer, it was
determined by the Administrative Law Judge that the employer was in no
position to pay the medical bills or the compensation benefits due in this
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matter, for the reason that for all practical purposes the employer is
insolvent.
Accordingly,
the Administrative
Law Judge
finds
that
the
provisions of Section 35-1-107, regarding the Default Indemnity Fund have been
triggered such that David B. Paulsen is entitled to an award from the Default
Indemnity Fund for the injuries he has sustained as a result of his industrial
injury.
On April 1, 1984 the applicant was earning $8.00 per hour working 40
hours per week and was married with three minor dependent children, which
entitles him to temporary total disability benefits in the amount of $233.44
per week and permanent partial impairment benefits in the amount of $200.00
per week, which is the statutory maximum.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
David B. Paulsen is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for
the industrial injury he sustained on April 1, 1984, which accident arose out
of or during the course of his employment with the defendant, Thomas A.
Paulsen, (uninsured).

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to
pay to David B. Paulsen, compensation at the rate of $233.44 per week for 21
weeks or a total of $4,902.24, as temporary total disability for the period
April 8, 1984 to and including September 1, 1984, resulting from the
industrial injury of April 1, 1984; said benefits to be paid in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to
pay to David B. Paulsen, compensation at the rate of $200.00 per week for 46.8
weeks or a total of $9,360.00, as compensation for a 15% permanent partial
impairment resulting from the industrial injury of April 1, 1984; said
benefits to commence effective September 2, 1984, with accrued amounts due and
owing in a lump sum.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to
pay to David B. Paulsen, the sum of $6,804.49, which amount represents the
medical expenses incurred by Mr. Paulsen as a result of the industrial injury
of April 1, 1984; Mr. Paulsen is to pay the medical care providers listed in
the Findings of Fact of this Order.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days from the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

lien
ive Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utat
Salt Lake City, Utah, this^ffi^day of January, 1985,
ATTEST:

^Linda J. St^4sburg, Commissi^ ^Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on January (Xc^ . 1984 a copy of the attached
ORDER was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Default Indemnity Fund
Thomas A. Paulsen
4708 Bronbreck Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
David B. Paulsen
1789 Ski View Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
St- Mark's Hospital
Attn: Lawrence Chinn
1200 East 3900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Dr. Jim Van Slooten
3424 South 2300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Dr. Jeffrey Peters
P.O. Box 346
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Dr. Robert Morrow
1220 East 3900 South Suite 4J
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Dr. Robert Lamb
1220 East 3900 South, Suite 4J
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Diagnostic Radiology Physicians
1141 East 3900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
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September 20, 1985

Judge Timothy C. Allen
Administrative Law Judge
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580

Dear Judge Allen,
On January 22, 1985, you issued an Order requiring that Thomas A. Paulsen
Co., pay David B. Paulsen certain sums of money representing Workers'
Compensation benefits as a result of his industrial accident.
You also made a finding that the employer was insolvent, and ordered that
the Default Indemnity Fund pay those benefits with full rights of subrogation.
Pursuant to your Order, the fund has made payment in this matter totalling
$21,002.63 and respectfully requests that you issue a Supplemental Order
requiring that Thomas A. Paulsen pay the fund this same sum. With your
Supplemental Order, the fund can then abstract your award for the purpose of
docketing it as a judgment.
Your attention
appreciated.

and consideration

in this

matter

would

be greatly

Very truly yours,

C-

'Suzan Pixton
Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund
SP/ca
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(UNINSURED),
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

SUPPLEMENTAL
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

On January 22, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the above-entitled matter, ordering the
Default Indemnity Fund of the Industrial Commission of Utah to pay temporary
total compensation benefits, medical expenses, and permanent partial
impairment benefits to David B. Paulsen, as a result of an industrial injury
he sustained on April 1, 1984, while employed by the Defendant, Thomas A.
Paulsen Company, (Uninsured). After taking the testimony of the Defendant,
the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Defendant was practically
insolvent, and accordingly, ordered the Default Indemnity Fund to pay the
Applicant benefits. As a result of that Order, the Default Indemnity Fund has
paid David B. Paulsen, $21,002.63, in worker's compensation benefits.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-107, the foregoing worker's compensation
benefits were and are the responsibility of the uninsured employer, Thomas A.
Paulsen Company. Pursuant to Section 107, the Default Indemnity Fund has full
rights of subrogation against the uninsured Defendant Employer, Thomas A.
Paulsen Company.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Thomas A. Paulsen Company pay the
Default Indemnity Fund of the Utah Industrial Commission, the sum of
$21,002.63, for benefits heretofore paid by the Fund on behalf of Thomas A.
Paulsen Company to David B. Paulsen for the industrial injury he sustained on
April 1, 1984.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/ ATTEST:

_day of October, 1985.

/ s / Linda J. Strasburg

CTTTcrar~J~. s t r a s B u r g

Commission Secretary
******

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on October
, 1985, a copy of the ^ttached
Supplemental Order in the case of David B. Paulsen issued October *
— 1985,
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

David B. Paulsen, 1789 Ski View Drive, Sandy, UT

84092

Thomas A. Paulsen Company, 4 708 BronBreck Drive, SLC, UT 84117
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 84000663
DAVID 8. PAULSEN,
Applicant,
MOTION FOR REVIEW
vs.
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY,
DEFENDANT.
Defendant, Thomas A. Paulsen, dba Thomas A. Paulsen
Comany, by and through his attorneys, moves the Industrial
Commission of Utah as follows:
1.

To review the Supplemental Order issued in the

above case on October 8, 1985, and vacate the same, or in the
event the motion to vacate is denied,
2.

To reopen the case for taking of further evidence

and to make further findings of fact to determine whether the
defendant Paulsen was, in fact, entitled to be treated as an
employer who was insured by a private carrier.
Defendant Paulsen asserts that the administrative law
judge was without statutory authority to modify, supplement, or
in any fashion alter the original Order dated January 22, 1985.
Section 35-1-82.52, U.C.A., provides that an order of
an administrative law judqe "shall be the final award of the
commission unless a petition for review is filed as provided in

35-1-82.53."

Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A., provides the only

statutory authority for issuing a supplemental order.

:

';,hfafe

':

section provides a supplemental order can be rendered after the
filing of a motion for review.

Its wording appears to compel the

conclusion that a motion for review is a condition precedent to a
supplemental order.

Section 35-1-82.55 provides that every

motion for review must be filed within fifteen days of the date
of the Order.

The time period for filing a motion to review the

January 22, 1985 Order ended on February 6r 1985.

The Default

Indemnity Fund of the Utah Industrial Commission filed its Motion
for Review on September 24, 1985.

The original Order dated

Janury 22/ 1985 became the final award of the Commission on
February 6, 1985, and thereafter, the administrative law judge
was without statutory authority to modify it.

The Supplemental

Order must be vacated as it is ultra vires.
Should the Commission determine that the administrative
law judge acted within his statutory authority, then the
Commission is authorized by Section 35-1-82.54 to review the
entire record and to make further findings of fact.

Defendant

Paulsen asserts that he was, by virtue of his conduct and the
legal obligation incumbent on the private insurer, insured at the
time the industrial accident took place.

Therefore, the sums

paid to applicant as compensation benefits are not the
responsibility of defendant.

Defendant Paulsen further asserts

that Section 35-1-107, U.C.A., does not provide that the workers'
compensation benefits were and are the responsibility o v Thomas
A. Paulsen Company.
Dated this 23rd day of October, 1985.
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER

Attorneys—tor Det^ftdarn
1020 Beneficia^Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 538-2021
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 23rd day of October, 1985, a copy
of the foregoing Motion for Review was mailed, postage prepaid,
to:
David B. Paulsen
1789 Ski View Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092
Susan Pixton
Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 84000663

DAVID B. PAULSEN,
Applicant,
vs.
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY
(UNINSURED),
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR REVIEW

On or about October 8, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.
On or about October 23, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendant by and through his attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administrative Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of October 8, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
€-''
ATTEST

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

day of November, 1985.

Linda J. Str^sSurg
Commission Secretary

^^J^/7\

Walter T. Axelgard
Commissioner

c/

Lenic^e L. Nielsen
CfoU UUttiUSSSUUJIUMSr
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on November /*- ' . 1985, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of David B. Paulsen, issued
November
)<t ^1985, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:

David B. Paulsen, 1789 Ski View Drive, Sandy, UT 84092
Thomas A. Paulsen Company, 4 709 BronBeck Drive, SLC, UT 84117
Brad Englund, Atty., 1020 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State
Street, SLC, UT 84111
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By. - : ~ ^ / .
Wilma
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ORIGINAL
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 8400066 3
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*

DAVID B. PAULSEN,

*
*

Applicant,
vs,
THOMAS A. PAULSEN

*
*
*

REPORT OF ffFARINC

*
*

COMPANY

(UNINSURED),

*
*

Defendant.

*
*
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HeaririK held in the Hearing Hoom of

the .Industrial

Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, October 1?, 19 8 H, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.: same being
pursuant to Order and Notice uf the Industrial Commission
of Utah.
Before TIMOTHY C. ALLEN, Administrative Law Judge.
APPEARANCES:
The Appl i can t Da v i d B . Pau 1 sen was presen t ,
not represented by counsel.
'The Defendant Thomas A. Paulsen was present,
not represented by counsel.
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David B. Paulsen
Thomas. A. Paulsen
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Q

Uh-huh.

A

But I think the next day we swept the building

out and just-stiffness--

You know.

Back to the usual work.

Arid the

I've had pulled muscles where it's, you k n o w -

When you work carpenter work and you have a pulled muse Je
you can't take time off.
work your way through it.

You get laid off.
You know.

So you just

I just worked my —

I just kept working and itfd get a little stiffer and a
little stiffer and a little stiffer.

And, you know, by the,

oh, I guess the 5th or the 6th or the 7th of April I was
losing my strength in my right arm,

it.

0

Uh-huh.

A

Now I have a doctor's report, if you want to read

You probably already have copies.
Q

Okay.

Wow who was the-So when did you first get medical treatment then?
A

I'd have to go get my--

0

Go get it.

Let's see.

You were going to tell me who you saw for

medical treatment?
A

Yeah.

I saw--

I went and saw--

Well, I went to

a chiropractor first.
Q

And what day was that?

If you can remember?

A

Oh, that was within the first ten days of April.

*te^f

11.

0

And who was it. you .saw?

A

No--

Q

Okay.

A

It was at the end of April.

Q

Who did you see?

A

I don't remember' the doctor's name.

Excuse rne.

It wa;; at the end of

A >r i1.

It w;is the

Hoiladay Chiropractic Clinic.

Q

Isn't that Dr.

A

Yeah.

0

Okay.

A

And I went to see him every day for about f ive

0

Did he take any

A

Yes.

0

Okay.

A

And then he recommended--

Van Slooten?

Dr. Van Slooten.

Night.

days.
X-rays?

He took X-rays.

After five days then he

recommend ed that I go see |)r . Morrow.

0

Dr. Robert; Morrow?

A

Yes .

0

So did you go .•:<•»> him?

A

Yes.

And the day that 1 saw Dr. Morrow he ad mi ttedj

me to the hospital that same day.
Q

1

A
Q

Wow was that May
I'm not sure.

1st?

I think May 1st was the--

Mow you saw Dr. Morrow or —

A-17

4MI

that

you a n d

I

A

It

was m o s t l y

0

Well,

The n a i l i n g

performed?

did

sweeping,

we p l a c e

the

wasn't
ledger(?)

it?
around

the

roof?

ledger?

A

Yes.

Yes,

we

did.

Q

And how did we get almost—well, close to 700

lineal feet of two-by-eight on the roof?
A

We pulled it up on the roof.

0

By hand, didn't we?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And we carried it, and we placed it?

12

A

Yeah.

13

Q

Right.

14

1 have a question, David--

I can't agree or disagree

1
15 with what you say, because your body isn't my body.

But,

16 when this occurred, why did you not tell me that you had
17 been injured?
IS
19 !0kay?
20 tunny

Well, because, for one thing I^m not a cry-baby.

A

And every

job I've ever worked for, [ mean I've had so

smashed fingers and pu.lled muscles that I eouJdn't

21 Lount them.

You know.

I've had pulled muscles on jobs every

22 [job I've ever worked on I've pulled a muscle or' felt Like
23 I've broken my back or--

You know.

This was just something

24 (that just seemed to get worse and worse and worse and worse
25 end worse.

And it got worse in the hospital also.

#^P
7\-l

Q

Q

As we parted company on March 30th, as 1 recall we

did that very amiably?
A

Yes.

0

And at that time it was my feeling — correct me if

I'm wrong — that you were feeling reasonably healthy?

In

that, as I observed, you w-vre walking upright, and you seemed
to have the full facility oV your body?
A

Yeah.

Q

Okay.

10

1 just wanted to make sure 1 was right on that.

11

Did I not call you on or about April 1ljth to find out

12 about your' injury?
13

A

Yeah.

Yeah, I remember you stated that you didn't

14 know that I had been injured until somebody told you at our
15 mother 's funeral.
16

0

17

Did I —

18

A

Yes.

That's right .

At that time I was. still hoping--

And I have an

19 uncle, Chris, that [ talked to at the graves!te,

Hnd

I sajd,

20 "Chris, we ought to go golfing sometime," I said, "as .••.oori n;
21

L' get rid of this kink in my neck."

You know.

Because it--

22 Kven at that time 1 thought, you know, that it would go away.
23

Q

24

That was at Mother's funeral on the Ulth?'

25

A

Yeah.

Yes.

